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A Cooperative Game of Information Trading: 
The Core, the Nueleolus and the Kernel 
By T. Driessen 1, S. Muto 2, and M. Nakayama 3 
Abstract: A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial 
owner of the information and n identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game 
theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n + 1)-person 
game with side payments. The symmetrical strong e-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the 
kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solu- 
tions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. 
1 An Economic Model of Information Trading 
We consider an industry consisting of a fixed number of identical producers of 
which all produce the same homogeneous output with the same technology. The 
profit level of each producer is identical and expressed in terms of monetary 
units. In addition to the producers there is another agent who possesses the infor- 
mation about a technological innovation. The new technology may increase the 
monetary profit level of the producers who acquire and utilize it, but may de- 
crease the profit level of the producers who don't purchase it and continue to use 
the old technology. Due to an external diseconomy, the profit level of every pro- 
ducer decreases as the number of producers who purchase the new technology 
grows. The initial owner of the information about he technological innovation 
has no means of production. As such, we regard the initial owner of the informa- 
tion as the seller of the technological innovation and the producers as the poten- 
tial buyers of the new technology. To be exact, the initial owner attempts to sell 
the information about he new technology to all or some of the producers. We 
aim to describe the profit that can be realized by the initial owner of the informa- 
tion if a trade of the information has been carried out. Concerning the pro- 
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ducers, the relevant comparison is between the profit level with the use of the new 
technology and the profit level obtained before the technological innovation. 
Our analysis of the above information trading situation will be based on a 
cooperative game model in which the players consist of the seller and the poten- 
tial buyers of the new technology. In other words, we define a so-called co- 
operative game in characteristic function form in such a way that the correspond- 
ing characteristic function reflects the cooperative behaviour between the seller 
and the potential buyers. In the context of the relevant game theoretic approach, 
it is permitted that the players communicate with one another in order to make 
binding agreements regarding the coalition formation. For instance, the pro- 
ducers can make a binding agreement ot to purchase the new technology if they 
want to do so. Further, a trade of the information can only be carried out on 
the understanding that resales of the new technology are completely prohibited. 
The exact cooperative game model of the information trading situation will be 
treated in Section 2. 
Following the cooperative setting of Section 2, the profit shares to the seller 
and the producers can be prescribed by basic solution concepts. The general no- 
tions of three main solution concepts - the strong e-cores (including the core), 
the nucleolus and the kernel - are discussed in Section 3. Our attention ismainly 
directed to the core and the nucleolus olution concepts. In the Sections 4, 5 and 
6 respectively, we determine the strong e-cores, the nucleolus (as well as the core) 
and the kernel of the cooperative game model of the information trading situa- 
tion. Section 7 deals with the monopolistic structure of the information trading 
situation and the implications for the solution concepts of the corresponding 
cooperative game model. Concluding remarks are given in Section 8. The most 
important results can be summarized as follows. 
The symmetrical strong e-core elements can be described in terms of two real- 
valued functions f and g of the real number e(cf. Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.4). 
The sign of the critical number e* satisfying f (e*)= g(e*) determines whether 
the core is empty or not (cf. Theorem 5.2). According to the nucleolus concept, 
the profit share to any producer equals either the amount f(e*) or the bound 
E* (n -  1) induced by the individual rationality principle (cf. Theorem 5.1). As 
a consequence, the core is nonempty if and only if the potential nucleolus profit 
share f(e*) to any producer exceeds his monetary profit level obtained before the 
technological innovation. Further, the nonemptiness of the core implies that the 
new technology is actually acquired by at least one producer or even all producers 
(cf. Theorem 5.3). Finally, the kernel coincides with the nucleolus (cf. Theorem 
6.2) and the monopolistic structure of the information trading situation yields an 
empty core (cf. Theorem 7.2). 
A Cooperative Game of Information Trading: The Core, the Nucleolus and the Kernel 57 
2 A Cooperative Game Model of Information Trading 
First of all, we specify four assumptions on the underlying economic model of 
the information trading situation as presented in Section 1. Recall that the initial 
owner seeks to sell the information about the technological innovation to all or 
some of the n producers (n_> 2). 
(A.1) Given any nontrivial number of actual buyers of the new technology, 
an actual buyer attains at least as many profits as a nonbuyer. 
(A.2 - 3) The external diseconomy applies to both the actual buyers and the non- 
buyers. That is, the profit level of any type of a producer decreases as 
the number of actual buyers grows. 
(A.4) The profit level of a unique buyer is more than the positive profit level 
obtained before the technological innovation. 
If t producers have purchased the new technology, then E(t) and E* (t) respec- 
tively denote the monetary profit level of any producer who has purchased the 
new technology and not. The collection {E(t),E* (t)l t ~ {0,1, . . . ,  n}} is called a 
profit structure of the information trading situation if it satisfies the above four 
assumptions, i.e., 
(A.1) E(t)>_E*(t) for all t~{1,2 . . . . .  n- l}  , 
(A.2) E(t)>_E(t+l) for all t~{1,2 . . . . .  n - l}  , 
(A.3) E*(t)>_E*(t+l) for all t~{O, 1 . . . . .  n- l}  , 
(A.4) E (1)>E*(0)>0 , E (0 )=E*(n) :=0 . 
For the sake of mathematical convenience, we put E(0) = E* (n) := 0. Next we 
model the information trading situation as a cooperative (n + 1)-person game 
where its player set N O consists of the seller 0 and the potential buyers 
1,2 . . . . .  n of the new technology. That is, N O = [0} u N where N: = {1,2 . . . . .  n} 
represents the set of all n producers. Any nonempty subset S of the player set 
N O (notation: S C NO) is called a coalition. A coalition which includes the seller 
is always denoted by S O in such a way that S O = {0} u S with S C N. The number 
of potential buyers in a coalition S O and S is denoted by s. 
The cornerstone of the cooperative game model is the so-called characteristic 
function v: 2N~ which assigns to every coalition its maximal joint profit. 
To be exact, the worth v(S ~ of any coalition S O represents the largest possible 
monetary profit what the producers in S O can achieve by the cooperative 
behaviour between themselves and the initial owner of the information about the 
technological innovation. Notice that the coalition S O must determine the profit 
independently of the members of the complementary coalition NO-  S O because 
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resales of the new technology are completely prohibited. In point of fact, the new 
technology is acquired and utilized by a suitable number of producers in S O so 
as to maximize the joint profit of production. Moreover, if the initial owner of 
the information is not a member of a coalition S, then the producers in S can 
not acquire the new technology by cooperation within S. Consequently, the 
worth v(S) of any coalition S represents he joint profit of production under the 
worst conceivable circumstance that all producers outside S do purchase the new 
technology. 
Definition 2.1: The cooperative game (NO; v) of the information trading situa- 
tion is given by 
v(S ~ : = max (tE(t) + (s-  t)E* (t) lt  e {0, 1 . . . . .  s}) for all S O C N O , 
v(S) :=sE*(n -s )  for all SCN . 
Obviously, the above information trading game (NO; v) satisfies 
v (N ~ _> n E* (0) = v (N) , v ({0}) = 0 , 
v({i})=E*(n-1) , v({O,i})=E(1) for all i eN  . 
3 Game Theoretic Notions 
The profit shares to the seller and the n producers will be described by means of 
a specific (n + D-dimensional payoff vector x = (Xo, Xl . . . . .  xn) e [R n+l where xi 
represents the payoff (the profit share) to player i. Following the cooperative 
game model of Section 2 and the solution part of cooperative game theory, it is 
customary to require that any payoff vector meets the efficiency and individual 
rationality principles. In other words, any payoff vector for the information 
trading game (NO; v) should belong to the imputation set I(v) which is defined 
to be 
I(v):  = [(Xo,Xl . . . . .  xn) e Nn+l xj= v(N ~ and 
j~N ~ 
xi>-v({i}) for all i eN~ 1 
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or equivalently, 
I(v):=I(Xo,X 1 . . . . .  Xn) e~ n+l ~oxj=v(N~ Xo>-O and 
j eN  
xi>_E*(n-1) forall i~N 1 . 
Note that the imputation set I(v) of the information trading game is nonempty 
since v(N~ l )E (n -  1)+E*(n-  1)>_nE*(n- 1) by using Definition 2.1 
and assumption A.1. The prescription of one or more specific imputations by 
basic solution concepts is mainly based on the notion of excess. The excess of 
the coalition T with respect o the payoff vector x in the information trading 
game (NO; v) is defined to be 
e(T,x): = v(T)-  ~ xj = v(T)-x(T) . 
j eT  
For the sake of notational convenience, we always write x(T) instead of ~ xj. 
j eT  
A nonnegative (nonpositive respectively) excess of T at x represents the gain 
(loss) to the coalition Tif its members withdraw from the payoff vector x in order 
to form their own coalition. 
Our main goal is to determine and discuss the profit shares to the seller and 
the producers on the basis of the "nucleolus" solution concept. The nucleolus of 
any cooperative game is a specific imputation of which the formal definition is 
given in terms of excess and "minimum complaint". For any imputation 
x~ ~n+l in the information trading game (NO; v), let the associated complaint 
vector O(x) be defined as the 2n+l-tuple whose components are the excesses 
e(T,x), T C N ~ arranged in nonincreasing order. The nucleolus of the informa- 
tion trading game (NO; v) consists of imputations that minimize the complaint 
function 0(.) of x in the lexicographic order on ~2,+~ over the nonempty com- 
pact convex imputation set I(v). It is well-known that the nucleolus of any 
cooperative game is always a singleton (cf. Schmeidler, 1969). The unique point 
in the nucleolus of the information trading game (NO; v) is denoted by t/(v). 
Generally speaking, the above formal definition of the nucleolus i useless for 
its determination. Our approach to the exact determination f the nucleolus of 
the information trading game will be guided by the position of the nucleolus 
within any nonempty "strong e-core'. Informally, the strong e-core of any 
cooperative game consists of efficient payoff vectors that give rise only to ex- 
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cesses not greater than e for all coalitions different from the grand coalition. 
Formally, the notion of a strong e-core is described as follows (cf. Shapley and 
Shubik, 1963, 1966). 
Definition 3.1: For any e e ~, the strong e-core Ce (v) of the information trading 
game (NO; v) is given by 
CAr) :  = x~ [R n+l x(N ~ = v(N ~ and 
x(T)>_v(T)-e fora l l  TCNO , T--/:N~ 1 
Evidently, the strong e-core is nonempty (empty respectively) if the real number 
e is large (small) enough. As a matter of fact, the inclusion C6(v) C C~(v) holds 
whenever ~ < e, with strict inclusion if C~ (v ) r  ~. Due to its formal definition, 
the nucleolus of any cooperative game is always contained in the nonempty in- 
tersection of any strong e-core with the imputation set (cf. Schmeidler, 1969). 
Theorem 3.2: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game. Then 
~(v) ~ Ce(v) c~ I(v) whenever Ce(v ) c~ I(v) r q~ . 
In Section 4 we describe both the structure of any strong e-core and the intersec- 
tion of any strong e-core with the imputation set. The above theorem is of the 
highest importance for the exact determination of the nucleolus of the informa- 
tion trading game (see Section 5). In Section 6 we determine the "kernel", a solu- 
tion concept which is closely related to the nucleolus. Davis and Maschler 0965) 
introduced the kernel of any cooperative game in terms of excess and "maximum 
surplus". In this paper we omit the formal definition of the kernel because we 
prefer to exploit the geometric haracterization for the kernel as presented in 
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979). In point of fact, we are interested in the 
geometric structure of the intersections of the kernel with the strong e-cores. The 
main idea in the relevant geometric approach is as follows. 
Consider a fixed strong e-core element x and two arbitrary players i,j. Let the 
i-th coordinate of x decrease and the j-th coordinate of x increase by the same 
nonnegative amount. Let the nonnegative real number ~ij(e,x) represent the 
largest amount hat can be transferred from player i to player j with respect o 
the strong e-core element x while remaining in the strong e-core. The critical 
number t~U(e,x) is well-defined because any nonempty strong e-core is a com- 
pact convex set. The next theorem treats the bisection property for the intersec- 
tion of the kernel K(v) with a nonempty strong e-core Cs(v) of the information 
trading game (NO; v). 
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Definition 3.3: Let e 9 ~, x 9 Ce(v) and i , j  9 N ~ i :/: j .  
Let e ie  R n+l, e Je [R n+l denote the i-th and j-th unit vector. The critical 
number Oij(e,x) 9 R is given by 
~ij (e, x) : = max (~l ~ e R, x - fie i + ~e; 9 C~ (v)) . 
Theorem 3.4: Let e 9 [R and x 9  Ce(v). Then 
x 9  nCe(v  ) iff xe I (v )  and f or all i , j eN  ~ , i=/ : j ,  
either fiij(e,x) = ~ji(e,x) 
or ~U(e,x)>~ji(e,x) and x i= v({i}) 
or ~U(e,x)<~ji(e,x) and x :=v({ j} ) .  
We say an imputation x 9  is interior to the imputation set I (v)  whenever 
xi> v([i}) for all i 9 N ~ The bisection property for the intersection of the kernel 
with a nonempty strong e-core states that a strong e-core element x which is in- 
terior to the imputation set, belongs to the kernel if and only if the element x is 
always the midpoint of the largest straight line segments through x in the various 
directions that are still included in the strong e-core. It is well-known that the 
kernel of any cooperative game is a (multi-) point set which always contains the 
nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler, 1969). 
4 The Strong e-Cores of the Information Trading Game 
Recall that the n producers are supposed to be identical. We say the producers 
are symmetrical players in the information trading game (NO; v). For that rea- 
son, we are merely interested in strong e-core elements x 9 ~ n +1 that satisfy the 
additional symmetry requirement xi = xj for all i , j  9 N. Thus we only consider 
symmetrical efficient payoff  vectors which are defined by x (a ) := (v(N~ - 
na ,a  . . . . .  a)  9 R n+l where a 9 E. In order to describe a lower and upper bound 
for the producer's payoff  according to symmetrical strong e-core elements, we 
first introduce the following two real-valued functions of e. 
Definition 4.1: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game. The functions f ,  
g: R--*~ are given by 
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f (e ) := max(E* (n - t ) - t - le ] te{1 ,2  . . . . .  n}) , 
g(e): = min ((n - s ) -1  [v(N o) _ v(S o) + e]lS o ~ N o) . 
An interpretation of the functions f and g is as follows. Concerning any e e JR, 
the idea is to impose either a cost of e (if e is nonnegative) or a bonus of - e (if 
e is nonpositive) on the formation of any coalition T r N O in the information 
trading game (NO; v). The producers are rewarded on the basis of the equal divi- 
sion principle. The functionfdescribes the maximal reward to a producer for his 
cooperative behaviour with respect o the formation of coalitions consisting of 
producers only. The producer's reward is derived from the earnings of the coali- 
tions to be formed. The function g describes the minimal reward to a producer 
for his noncooperative b haviour with respect to the formation of coalitions con- 
taining the initial owner of the information about the technological innovation. 
The producer's reward is derived from the remaining parts of the total amount 
v(N ~ after the formation of the coalitions involved. The first lemma states that 
the producer's payoff according to symmetrical strong e-core elements i at least 
f(e) and at most g(e). 
Lemma 4.2: Let e e •. Then 
x(a)eC~(v) iff f(e)<_a<g(e) .
Proof." By the three Definitions 3.1, 2.1 and 4.1, we obtain the following 
equivalences: 
x(a) e CAr) 
(x(a))(T)>_v(T)-e for all TCN ~ TCN~162 
v(N~176 for all S~ ~ , 
andsa>_sE*(n -s ) -e  for all SCN,  Sr162  
a<_(n-s)- l [v(N~176 fora l l  S~ ~ , 
anda>_E*(n - t ) - t - l~  for all te [1 ,2  . . . . .  n} 
,~ f(e)_<a__.g(~) . [] 
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Our purpose is to describe the smallest nonempty strong t-core that intersects 
the imputat ion set at a unique symmetrical  imputation. The main results are 
treated in the next theorem and are proved with the aid of the properties of the 
functions f and g as listed in the second lemma. 
Lemma 4.3: 
(i) f ,g :  ~ are continuous functions; 
f is strictly decreasing, i.e., t~< e implies f ( f i )  >f (e ) ;  
g is strictly increasing, i.e., fi < e implies g (fi) < g (e). 
(ii) f (e )= E* (O) -n - le  for all e>0.  
(iii) There exists a unique e* e R with f (e* )  = g(e*). 
(iv) I f  e*>n[E* (O) -E* (n -1) ] ,  then there exists a unique ge(e* ,oo)  with 
g(g) = E* (h -  1). 
Proof." (i) Clearly, f (g respectively) is a continuous and strictly decreasing (in- 
creasing) function of  e because it is defined as max imum (minimum) of a finite 
number  of  continuous and strictly decreasing (increasing) functions of  e. 
(ii) Let e _> 0 and t e {1,2 . . . . .  n}. Then E*  (0) >E*  (n - t) by Assumpt ion A.3 
and so, E*  (n - t) - t - i e_< E*  (0) - t - 1 e_<E* (0) - n - 1 e. It follows that f (e)  = 
E* (O) -n - le  for all e_>0. 
(iii) Define the function h: [R~ by h(e):  =f(e) -g (e )  for all e e JR. F rom 
part (i) we deduce that h is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of e. 
Further, it is obvious that the function h satisfies both h(e)? oo if e$ -oo and 
h (e)$ -oo  if eq' co.  By applying the intermediate value theorem to the function h, 
we conclude that there exists a unique e* e [R with h (e*) = 0. This proves the 
statement (iii). 
(iv) Suppose e * > n [E* (0) - E*  (n - 1)]. Then e * > 0 and so, the parts (ii) - 
(iii) yield g(e*) = f (e* )  = E*  (0 ) -  n - l  e*. We obtain that g is a continuous and 
strictly increasing function of  e with g(e*)<E* (n -  1) and g(e)T oo if eT oo. By 
applying the intermediate value theorem to the function g, we conclude that there 
exists a unique g~ (e*, ao) with g(g) = E* (n -  1). [] 
Theorem 4.4: 
O) x(a)  ~ Ce,(v) i f f  a = f(e*).  
( i i)  I f  e * < n [E*  (0)  - E*  (n - 1)], then x(a)  ~ CE, (v) implies x(a)  ~ I(v). 
(iii) I f  e*  > n [E*  (0)  - E*(n  - 1)], then x(a)  ~ Ce(v) n I(v) i f f  a = E*  (n - 1). 
Proof." The statement (i) follows immediately f rom Lemma 4.2 and f (e* )= 
g(e*).  Concerning the remaining two statements, we already remark that the 
equivalence x(a ) ~ I (v ) r E * (n - 1) <_ a <_ n - 1 v (N ~ holds. 
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(ii) Suppose e*<_n[E*(O)-E*(n-1)]. In case e*_<0, then the inclusions 
C,.(v) C Co(v) C I(v) hold. So, we may also suppose e*>0.  Now we obtain 
f(e*) = E*(O)-n -le*___ E*(n -  1) and f(e*) = E*(O)-n - le*<E*(0)_< 
n-iv(N~ In other words, x(a)e I (v )  for a =f(e*). In view of part (i), this 
proves the statement (ii). 
(iii) Suppose * > n [E* (0) - E* (n - 1)]. Then e * > 0 and by Lemma 4.3 (iv), 
we have g>e* as well as g(g)= E*(n-1).  From g>e*>0 we deduce f (g)= 
E* (0) - n - 1 g < E* (0) - n - 1 e * < E* (n - 1). Due to Lemma 4.2, the equivalence 
x(a)ECe(v)**f(g)<_a<_g(g) holds, whereas the inequality E*(n-1)_< 
n -1 v(NO) always holds. Now we conclude that x(a) ~ Ce(v) •I(v) if and only 
if a = g(g) = E* (n - 1). [] 
5 The Nucleolus and the Core of the Information Trading Game 
A well-known property for the nucleolus concept states that symmetrical players 
in any cooperative game receive the same payoff according to the nucleolus of 
the game. Particularly, the symmetrical producers in the information trading 
game (NO; v) get the same nucleolus payoff, i.e., rh(V ) = ~/j(v) for all i,j ~ N. In 
view of the crucial Theorem 3.2, the nucleolus of the information trading game 
will be determined as the unique symmetrical imputation that is still contained 
in the nonempty intersection of a suitably chosen strong e-core with the imputa- 
tion set. For that purpose, we must distinguish two cases as indicated in Theorem 
4.4. 
Theorem 5.1: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game. 
(i) If e*<_n[E*(O)-E*(n- 1)], then the nucleolus r/(v) = (v(N~ 
f(e *) . . . . .  f(e *)) e [R n + 1. 
(ii) If e*>n[E*(O)-E*(n-  1)], then the nucleolus r/(v) = (v(N~ - 1), 
E* (n -  1) , . . .  ,E* (n -  1)) e [R n+l 
Proof." Since r / (v )e l (v )  and rh(V)= rlj(v) for all i , jeN,  the nucleolus r/(v) is 
of the form (v(N~ ~, . . . , /3 )eR  n+l for a certain t ieR .  Shortly, ~(v) 
= x(B) where/~ e fiR. 
(i) Suppose * _< n [E* (0) - E* (n - 1)]. From Theorem 4.4 (i) - (ii), we deduce 
that the equivalence x(a) e Ce. (v) c~ I(v) ** a =f(e *) holds for any a e R. From 
this we conclude that ~(v)= x(B) where fl =f(e*) .  
(ii) Suppose e*>n[E*(O)-E*(n-1)].  By Theorem 4.4 (iii), the set Ce(v) 
h i (v )  is nonempty and it contains the unique symmetrical imputation x(a) 
where a=E*(n -1) .  From this we conclude that ~/(v)=x(f l)  where f l= 
E*(n -  1). [] 
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The nucleolus payoff  (e*) to a producer reflects the situation in which the pro- 
ducer's maximal reward for his cooperative behaviour (with respect to the forma- 
tion of coalitions consisting of producers only) matches exactly his minimal 
reward for his noncooperative b haviour (with respect to the formation of coali- 
tions containing the initial owner of the information about he technological in- 
novation). The individual rationality principle must always be met by the 
nucleolus and therefore, the nucleolus payoff to a producer equals his single 
worth E* (n - l) in case the amount f(e*) is less than his single worth. 
The remainder of the section deals with the "core" solution concept which 
was introduced in game theory in Gillies (1953). The core of any cooperative 
game consists of imputations that give rise only to nonpositive xcesses and as 
such, the core can be regarded as the strong 0-core. As a matter of fact, the no- 
tion of a strong e-core was presented as a generalization f the core (cf. Shapley 
and Shubik, 1963, 1966) because the core itself may be empty. It follows im- 
mediately from Theorem 3.2 that the nucleolus of any cooperative game is 
always included in the nonempty core. According to the next theorem, the 
nonemptiness of the core C(v) for the information trading game (N~ 
depends on the sign of the corresponding critical number e* satisfying f(e*) = 
g (e *). 
Theorem 5.2: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game. Then C(v) ~ ~ iff 
e*_<0. 
Proof: (i) Suppose e*_<0 or equivalently, f(0)_<g(0). Lemma 4.2 yields that 
x(a) ~ C(v) for all a ~ [E with f(O)<_a<_g(O). Thus, C(v) ~ (b whenever e*_<0. 
(ii) To prove the converse statement, suppose C(v)~ 0. Then we have 
11 (v) ~ C(v), while the nucleolus ~/(v) is of the form x(fl) where fl ~ •. By apply- 
ing Lemma 4.2 to x(fl) e C(v), we obtain f(O)<_fl<_g(O). So, C(v) ~ q) implies 
f(0)_<g(0) or equivalently, e*-<0. [] 
The core of the information trading ame is nonempty if and only if the critical 
number e* induces a bonus (the size of -8  *) on the formation of any coalition 
different from the grand coalition. In other words, the information trading ame 
possesses a nonempty core iff the potential nucleolus payoff (e*) to any pro- 
ducer exceeds his monetary profit level E* (0) obtained before the technological 
innovation. 
Regarding the formation of the grand coalition N O , we pay attention to the 
number of producers who purchase the new technology. Here we suppose that 
the information about the technological innovation is shared between the 
smallest number of producers in case there are more numbers for which the maxi- 
mum in the expression of the worth v(NO) is attained. To be exact, we define 
the number of producers who actually acquire the new technology by 
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m:= min(rlr~{O, 1. . . . .  n} , rE ( r )+(n - r )E* ( r )  = v(N~ . 
Next we mention two relations between the number m and the nonemptiness of
the core for the information trading game. 
Theorem 5.3: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game. 
(i) If C(v) ~ 0, then m ~: 0. 
(ii) If C(v) --/: 4) and E*(0)>E*(1) ,  then m = n. 
Proof." (i) Suppose C(v) r  lb. By Theorem 5.2, we have e*_0  or equivalently, 
g(0)>f(0).  It follows that (n -s ) - l [v (N~176 for all S~ ~ 
From S O = [0, 1} we deduce v(N ~ + (n -  1)E* (0), whereas E(1) >E*  (0) 
by Assumption A.4. We obtain the strict inequality v(N~ nE*(O) and there- 
fore, m :g 0. 
(ii) Suppose C(v) r  and E*(0)>E*(1) .  We establish the equality m = n. 
Assume on the contrary m r n. Choose x e C(v) and let i eN.  From m 
{0, 1 . . . . .  n -  1} we derive that v(N~ - 1 -m)E* (m) ,  whereas 
v (N ~ = mE(m)+ (n -m)E*  (m) by definition of the number m. Together with 
x ~ C(v), this yields xi = v(N ~ -x (N  ~ {i})-< v(N ~ - v (N  ~ {il)-<E* (m). So, 
xi<_E * (m) for all i e N. Summing up over all i E N, we obtain x(N)<_nE*(m).  
Furthermore, x(N)>_v(N)=nE*(O)  because of xeC(v) .  It follows that 
nE* (m) >_x(N) >_ nE* (0) and therefore, E* (m) _>E* (0) >E*  (1). From this and 
Assumption A.3, we conclude that m = 0. However, part (i) states that m = 0 is 
in contradiction with C(v) r q~. [] 
Let the information trading game possess a nonempty core. Then Theorem 5.3 
(i) expresses that at least one producer obtains the information about the 
technological innovation. Besides, the new technology is actually acquired by 
every producer whenever the profit structure satisfies the strict inequality 
E* (0)>E* (1). Here the additional requirement simply says that an actual buyer 
of the new technology causes a strict decrease of the profit level of the non- 
buyers. 
6 The Kernel of the Information Trading Game 
Analogous to the nucleolus, the kernel of any cooperative game possesses the 
property that symmetrical players in the game receive the same payoff according 
to a kernel element (cf. Maschler and Peleg, 1966). In particular, the payoffs by 
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kernel elements to the symmetrical producers in the information trading game 
(NO;v) satisfy xi =xj for all i , j~Nand all x~K(v) .  For that reason, we apply 
both Definition 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 to symmetrical strong e-core elements in 
the information trading game. The obtained result states that the kernel K(v) of 
the information trading game coincides with the nucleolus. 
Lemma 6.1: Let e e R, a e R and x(a) ~ C~(v). Then 
(i) gio(e,x(a))= e - f - l (a )  for all i eN ,  
(ii) ~oj(e,x(a)) = e -g - l (a )  for all j eN .  
Proof." By Lemma 4.2, we havef(e)<a<g(e).  Let i , j~NO be such that i~:j. 
For any f ie JR, we define the vector y~ e ~n+l by y~: = x(a) -~ei+~e j. Note 
that the inverse f -1  (g- 1 respectively) of the function f (g)  exists because f (g)  is 
a strictly decreasing (increasing) function. 
(a) Consider the case i = 0. Suppose g> e - g - 1 (6) or equivalently, g(e - ~) < a. 
Then there exists S O g NO such that (n - s ) - l [v  (N ~ - v (S ~ + e -  f i]< a. Without 
loss of generality, we may assume j ~S ~ (otherwise, replace S O by the coalition 
(S~ of equal worth where k eN~176 Now we obtain y~(S ~ = 
v(N ~ + (s -n  )a -  ~ < v(S ~ -e .  From this we conclude that y~ ~C~(v) whenever 
8>e-g- l (a ) .  
(b) Consider the case i = 0. Suppose g = e-g  -1 (a) or equivalently, g(e-O) 
= a. This yields a<(n-s )  -1 [v(N~176 for all S o ~NO. It follows 
that ya (S ~ = v(NO) + (s-  n )a - O >_ v(S~ - e for all S~ satisfying j ~i S ~ 
From both ~_>0 and x(a) e C~(v), we deduce that y~(T)>_ v(T) -e  for all other 
TCN ~ T--/:N~162 We conclude that y~ eC~(v) whenever g=e-g- l (a ) .  
Together with part (a), this proves the statement (ii). It is left to the reader to 
establish the statement (i) by using similar reasonings as in the parts (a) - (b) .  
[] 
Theorem 6.2: The kernel K(v) of the information trading game (NO; v) is a 
singleton consisting of the nucleolus t/(v). That is, K(v)= {t/(v)}. 
Proof" Let x ~ K(v). Since x e I(v) and x i = Xj  for all i,j e N, the kernel element 
x is of the form (v(N~ fl . . . . .  f l )~R n+l for a certain f ie  R. Shortly, 
x = x(fl) where f le  R. Choose the real number e large enough such that x(fl) 
Ce(v). By applying Theorem 3.4 to the vector x(fl), only one of the following 
three cases (1)- (3)  must hold. 
(1) Ool(e,x(fl))= Ol0(e,x(fl)). In view of Lemma 6.1, the relevant equality is 
equivalent to f -  1 (fl) = g - 1 (fl), i.e., fl = f(e *). 
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(2) dol(e,x([3))>Olo(e,x(fl)) andx0(fl)= v({0}). This is equivalent to f (e*)>f l  
and fl = n -1 v(N~ As such, the strict inequality f(e*)>n-1 v(N o) holds. 
(3) 001 (e, x(fl)) < Ol0 (e, x(fl)) and xi (fl) = v({1}). This is equivalent to f(e *) < fl 
and fl = E* (n - 1). As such, the strict inequality f(e *) <E*  (n - 1) holds. 
Now we distinguish two cases as indicated in Theorem 5.1. 
(i) Suppose e* _ n[E* (0) - E* (n - 1)]. It follows immediately from Theorem 
4.4 (i)-(i i) that x(a)eI(v) for a =f(~*). This yields E*(n-1)<_f(e*) 
<_ n-iv(N~ Regarding the above cases (1)- (3), we conclude that case (1) 
must hold. Hence,/~ = f(e*) whenever x(13)e K(v). 
(ii) Suppose e*>n[E*(O)-E*(n-1)]. Then e*>0 and so, f (e* )=E*(0) -  
n -le*<E*(n- 1). Together with x(13) el(v), this implies fl>_E*(n- 1)> 
f(c*). From/~>f(e*)  we conclude that case (3) must hold. Hence, /~= 
E* (n - 1) whenever x(13) eK(v). 
Combining the results obtained in the cases (i)-(i i) and Theorem 5. i, we 
have established the inclusion K(v) C {t/(v)}. Generally speaking, the kernel of 
any cooperative game always contains the nucleolus (of. Schmeidler, 1969). 
Therefore, the equality K(v) = {r/(v)} is valid for the information trading game. 
[] 
7 The Information Trading Game with a Monopolistic Profit Structure 
This section is devoted to the study of the information trading game arising from 
a particular type of a profit structure. Firstly, the joint profit of any number of 
actual buyers of the new technology is supposed to be optimal in the situation 
with a unique buyer. Secondly, there are no profits for the non-buyers whenever 
a trade of the information has been carried out. Formally, the profit structure 
{E(t),E* (t)[t e{O, 1 , . . . ,  n}} of the information trading situation is said to be 
monopolistic if it satisfies the above two assumptions, i.e., 
(A.5) E(1)>_tE(t) for all te{1,2 . . . . .  n ] ,  
(A.6) E* ( t )=0 for aU te{1,2 . . . . .  n}.  
The information trading game (N~ v) with a monopolistic profit structure is as 
follows (cf. Definition 2.1): 
v(S~ = max (E(I),sE* (0)) for all S o C N ~ S o :# [0} , 
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v (S ) :=O fo ra l l  SCN,  SeN,  
v ({01) : = 0 , v (N) : = n E* (0) . 
Notice that the relevant game (NO; v) is zero-normalized (i.e., v([i}) = 0 for all 
i~NO) and monotonic  (i.e., T1 C T2CNO implies v(TO<_v(T2) ). The main 
results for the information trading situation with a monopolistic profit structure 
are derived from the exact determination of  the critical number e* satisfying 
f (e*)  = g(e *). 
Proposition 7.1: Let (NO;v) be the information trading game with a 
monopolistic profit structure. 
(i) I f  E(1)<nE*(O), then m = 0, e* = (2n-  1)-ln[E(1)-E*(O)] and f(e*) = 
(2n - 1)-1 [2nE*  (0) - E(1)]. 
(ii) I f  E(1)>nE*(O), then m = 1, e*= (2n-1)- ln(n - 1)E*(0) and f(e*)= 
(2n - 1)- 1 nE* (0). 
Proof." (i) Suppose E(1)<_nE*(O). Then we have v(NO) = nE*(O) and so, m = 0 
by using the definition of  the number m. Straightforward calculations yield that 
for all e _> 0 
g(e) = min (E* (0) + n - t e, (n - 1)- 1 [nE* (0) - E(1) + e ]) . 
Put  ~:= (2n-  1 ) - in  [E (1 ) -  E*  (0)]. In view of Assumption A.4, the real num- 
ber ~ satisfies 0 < ~ < n [E(1) - E*  (0)]. From this and Lemma 4.3 (ii), it follows 
that g(~) = (n -  1) -1 [nE*(O)-E(1)+~] and f (~)  = E*(O)-n -ig. From f(t~) 
= (2n - 1) -1 [2nE*(O)-E(1)] = g(fi), we conclude that e* = ~. This proves the 
statement (i). 
(ii) Suppose E(1)>nE*(O). Then we have that v(NO)= v(S ~ = E(1) for all 
S O C N ~ S~ {01. Straightforward calculations yield that for all e___0 
g(e) = min (n -1 [E(1) + el, (n - 1 ) - le )  . 
Put  y:=(2n-1)- ln(n-1)E*(O). Now the real number 7 satisfies 0<7< 
(n -  DE( l )  because y<_nE*(O)<E(1)<(n- 1)E(1). It follows that g(?)  = 
(n - 1)-1 y and f (y )  = E* (0) - n - 1 ~. From f (y )  = (2n - 1)- 1 nE* (0) = g(7), we 
conclude that e* = 7. Furthermore, v(N ~ = E(1) > nE* (0) implies m = 1. This 
proves the statement (ii). [] 
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Theorem 7.2: Let (NO; v) be the information trading game with a monopolistic 
profit structure. Then the core C(v)  = ~ and the nucleolus 
~l(v) = (v (N~ *) , f (e*)  . . . .  ,f(e*)) e IR n+l 
where 
f (e* )  = (2n-1) -~[2nE*(O) -E (1) ]  if E(1)<nE*(O)  , 
= (2n-1) - lnE* (0)  if E(1)>nE*(O)  . 
Proof." In view of the two Theorems 5.1 (i), 5.2 and Proposition 7.1, it suffices 
to establish the inequalities 0 < e * _< n [E* (0) - E* (n - 1)]. Because E* (n - 1) = 0 
for a monopolistic profit structure, the relevant inequalities reduce to 0<e*  
<_ nE*  (0). We distinguish two cases. 
(i) Suppose E(I)<_nE*(O).  By Proposition 7.1 (i), we get e*= (2n-1) - ln  
•  From this and Assumption A.4, it is evident that 0<e*  
_< (2n - 1)- 1 n (n - I )E* (0) _< nE*  (0). 
(ii) Suppose E( I )>nE*(O) .  By Proposition 7.1 (ii), we get e*= (2n-1) -1n  
• (n -  1)E* (0). Obviously, 0 < e * _< nE*  (0). In both cases, we conclude that the 
relevant inequalities 0< e*<__ nE* (0) hold. [] 
Proposition 7.1 (ii) expresses that, in case E(1)> hE*  (0), the new technology is
actually acquired by one of the producers. Under these circumstances, the 
monopolistic joint profit is shared between the initial owner of the information 
about the technological innovation and all of the producers in such a way that 
the profit share to the seller (according to the nucleolus) is more than the profit 
share to any producer. In case E(1)<_nE* (0), the information about the new 
technology cannot be sold and the positive profit share e* to the initial owner 
of the information can be interpreted as a compensation for not selling the infor- 
mation at all. Notice that the relevant compensation exceeds the profit share to 
any producer if and only if E(1)_< nE*  (0)_< 3- l (n + 1)E(1). 
8 Concluding Remarks on Related Literature 
From a cooperative game theoretic viewpoint, we have analyzed a certain trade 
of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of 
the information and n identical producers. Noncooperative game theoretic 
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analyses of related information trading problems have been carried out in Ka- 
mien and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Kamien, Tauman and Zang (1988). For in- 
stance, the noncooperative approach in Kamien and Tauman (1984) disclosed 
that the profit of any producer generally declines relative to his monetary profit 
level obtained before the technological innovation. In our cooperative setting, 
the same conclusion depends on the (non)emptiness of the core of the 
cooperative game model. 
Earlier work on the information trading problem can be traced back to Ar- 
row (1962). If the technological innovation is "drastic" in the sense of Arrow, 
then the noncooperative game models of the information trading problem 
degenerate into a monopoly (cf. Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Muto, 1987). 
The characteristic function of our cooperative game model as presented in 
Definition 2.1 is strongly based on the two assumptions that the initial owner of 
the information about a technological innovation is not a producer and that 
resales of the new technology are completely prohibited. In case the initial owner 
of the information can also produce the output, then the information trading 
situation can be modelled as a cooperative game whose type is an example of the 
so-called "big boss games" (cf. Muto et al., 1988). If we relax the assumption 
of perfect patent protection and allow resales of the new technology, considera- 
tions will be necessary on what kind of coalitional behaviour is appropriate. 
Regarding this topic, Nakayama (1986) proposed a bargaining set-type solution. 
Cooperative game theoretic approaches in this direction would merit further 
study. 
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